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Abstract
In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or
as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success
functions. In the rst we analyze the implications of contestants incomplete information
concerning the type of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants
this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into
di¢ culties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success
functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems
which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for
popular contest success functions and guidelines for the denition of new ones.
Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function.
JEL Classication: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political
Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conict; Conict Resolution; Alliances).
 This paper is the melting of two independent projects. We are grateful for important input from Nicolás
Porteiro and regret his decision not to co-author the more extensive analysis of the present paper. We also wish
to thank J. Atsu Amegashie, Miguel A. Ballester, Carmen Beviá, Steven Callander, Caterina Calsamiglia, Juan
A. Crespo, Francesco De Sinopoli, Bard Harstad, Sjaak Hurkens, Carolina Manzano, Carlos Maravall, Antonio
Quesada, Bernd Theilen, William Thomson and Cori Vilella for helpful comments. The suggestions by the editor
C. D. Aliprantis and an anonymous referee substantially improved the analysis. The usual disclaimer applies.
This work has been partially carried out while Dahm was visiting Northwestern University (Kellogg School of
Management, MEDS, CMS-EMS). The hospitality of this institution and the nancial support of the Spanish
Secretaría de Estado de Educación y Universidades with co-funding by the European Social Fond is gratefully
acknowledged. The rst author acknowledges nancial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y
Ciencia, project SEJ2005-06167/ECON and the second by the Departament dUniversitats, Recerca i Societat
de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya), project 2005SGR00949 and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y
Ciencia, project SEJ2007-67580-C02-01.
y Departamento de Economía. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Calle Madrid, 126. 28903 Getafe (Madrid).
Spain. E-mail: lcorchon@eco.uc3m.es. Phone: +34 916 249617. Fax: +34 916 249875.
z Departamento de Economía. Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Avenida de la Universitat, 1. 43204 Reus (Tarrag-
ona). Spain. E-mail: matthias.dahm@urv.cat. Phone: +34 977 759 850. Fax: +34 977 759 810.
1
The strategic approach also seeks to combine axiomatic cooperative solutions and non-
cooperative solutions. Roger Myerson recently named this task the Nash program.(Rubinstein
(1985), p. 1151)
1 Introduction
A contest is a game in which players exert e¤ort in order to win a certain prize. Contests have
been used to analyze a variety of situations including lobbying, rent-seeking and rent-defending
contests, advertising, litigation, political campaigns, conict, patent races, arms races, sports
events or R&D competition. A crucial determinant for the equilibrium predictions of contests is
the specication of the so-called contest success function (CSF) which relates the playerse¤orts
and win probabilities. Justications for a particular CSF can be twofold. A justication can
be on normative grounds, because it is the unique CSF fullling certain axioms, or essential
properties. A justication can also be positive when it can be shown that the CSF arises from
the strategic interaction of players, thereby yielding a description of situations when it can be
expected to be realistic. The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to our understanding
of CSFs in both dimensions.
Formally, a contest success function associates, to each vector of e¤ortsG, a lottery specifying
for each agent a probability pi of getting the object. That is, pi = pi(G) is such that, for each
contestant i 2 N := f1; :::; ng, pi(G)  0, and
Pn
i=1 pi (G) = 1.
The canonical example of a contest situation is rent-seeking. In a pioneering paper, Tullock
(1980) proposed a special form of the contest success function, namely, given a positive scalar
R,
pi =
GRiPn
j=1G
R
j
; for i = 1; :::; n. (1)
Gradstein (1995, 1998) postulated the following variation of this form where, given qi > 0 for
all i 2 N ,
pi =
GiqiPn
j=1Gjqj
; for i = 1; :::; n. (2)
A generalization that comprises both previous functional forms is, given ai  0 for all i 2 N ,
pi =
GRi qi + aiPn
j=1(G
R
j qj + aj)
; for i = 1; :::; n. (3)
A di¤erent functional form, the logit model, was proposed by Hirshleifer (1989) where, given a
positive scalar k,
pi =
ekGiPn
j=1 e
kGj
; for i = 1; :::; n. (4)
Note that the four expressions (1) (4) are specic instances of the following functional form
pi =
fi(Gi)Pn
j=1 fj(Gj)
; for i = 1; :::; n. (5)
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The so-called e¤ectivity functions fi are usually interpreted as determining how e¤ectiveagent
is e¤ort is in a¤ecting the win probability of agent i. Most papers dealing with contest models
in the literature analyze a CSF which is a special case of the additive form in (5) (Nitzan
(1994), Konrad (2007)). Consequently, the present paper will be mainly concerned with deriving
foundations for CSFs of this form. Notice, for later reference, that in (5) the win probability
of any contestant is responsive to changes in the e¤orts of all other contestants, if the fi are
strictly increasing.
However, there are also some CSFs in the literature which are not special cases of the form in
(5). The rst two consider the case of two contestants and build on the idea that only di¤erences
in e¤ort should matter  an idea introduced by Hirshleifer in (4). Baik (1998) proposed the
following form, given a positive scalar ,
p1 = p1(G1  G2) and p2 = 1  p1. (6)
Che and Gale (2000) postulate the following piece-wise linear di¤erence-form
p1 = max

min

1
2
+ (G1  G2); 1

; 0

and p2 = 1  p1. (7)
Recently, Alcalde and Dahm (2007) proposed a CSF in which relative di¤erences matter. Given
an ordered vector of e¤orts such that G1  G2  :::  Gn and a positive scalar R, the serial
contest success function is dened as
pi =
nX
j=i
GRj  GRj+1
j GR1
, for i = 1; :::; n with Gn+1 = 0. (8)
In the literature the outcome of contests has been interpreted to capture two di¤erent sit-
uations: as win probabilities or as shares of the prize.1 With this in mind, we examine two
approaches to contest success functions.
In the rst we postulate the existence of a contest administrator who allocates the prize to
one of the contestants. However, contestants have incomplete information about the type of
the contest administrator. We show that this approach can generate CSFs for any number of
contestants. However, while in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize a large
class of contest success functions, we show that it runs into di¢ culties when there are more
agents.
Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a
connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants.
The analysis exploits the observation that these problems are mathematically related but not
equivalent to the problem of assigning win probabilities in contests. A main result here follows
Dagan and Volij (1993) and shows that the class of contest success functions given in (5) can be
understood as the weighted Nash bargaining solution where e¤orts represent the weights of the
1A prominent example for the latter is Wärneryd (1998). He analyzes a contest among jurisdictions for shares
of the GNP and compares di¤erent types of jurisdictional organization.
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agents. We turn then to the framework of bargaining with claims (Chun and Thomson (1992))
to incorporate explicitly the contestantse¤orts in the description of the problem. This allows
to associate prominent solution concepts in this framework to the previously mentioned class of
contest success functions and to a generalized version of Che and Gales di¤erence-form contest
(7).
Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for
the denition of new ones. In our view both types of foundations complement each other nicely.
For instance, we show that (7) can be understood, on one hand, as contestants trying to sway
away the contest administrators decision in a setting analogous to the model of a circular city
by Salop (1979). On the other, we show that this CSF is also related to the claim-egalitarian
solution (Bossert (1993)). Both approaches lend support to an extension of this CSF to three
contestants of the following form. Let G1  G2  G3 and a and b be positive scalars. If
G1 G3  a then p3 = 0 and the other contestants obtain win probabilities as in (7). Otherwise
let
pi =
1
3
+ b (2Gi  Gj  Gk) , for i = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; k. (9)
However, the requirement that for n = 2 the CSF reduces to (7) implies that (a; b) = ((3) 1; =2)
in the rst and (a; b) = ((2) 1; 2=3) in the second approach. This underlines that the ap-
propriate extension depends on the application and institutional details the contest model is
intended to capture.
Foundations for contest success functions have been reviewed by Garnkel and Skaperdas
(2007) and Konrad (2007). The most systematic approach has been normative and the seminal
paper is Skaperdas (1996). He proposed ve axioms and showed that they are equivalent to
assuming a CSF of the form given in (5) with fi() = f() for all i 2 N , where f() is a positive
increasing function of its argument. Skaperdas also showed that if in addition to the other ve
axioms the CSF is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in G then we obtain (1).2 Our
paper contributes to this literature indirectly by making connections to related problems which
are well understood from a normative point of view. For instance, we establish a relationship
between Che and Gales di¤erence-form CSF (7) and the principle of equal sacrice.
As for the positive approach, we are not aware of any work understanding CSFs as sharing
rules as our second approach does.3 However, our rst approach is related to other works.
Assume that e¤orts are a noisy predictor of performance in the contest. When noise enters
additively in performance and is distributed as the extreme value distribution, we obtain the
logit specication, McFadden (1974). This procedure was generalized by Lazear and Rosen
2An extension of Skaperdasresult to non-anonymous CSFs is given by Clark and Riis (1998). Skaperdas also
axiomatized the logit model (4).
3Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) present a model in which a two party conict over a resource can
either be settled through bargaining over the resource or through a contest. The contest denes the disagreement
point of the bargaining problem to which three di¤erent bargaining solutions are applied. See also Esteban and
Sákovics (2006). In contrast, in our framework we interpret bargaining to be over win probabilities and derive
contest success functions as bargaining rules.
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(1981) and Dixit (1987) to general distributions.4 Our approach di¤ers from these papers by
changing performance to the broader concept of utility and using a uniformly distributed and
one dimensional random variable.
Epstein and Nitzan (2006) partially rationalize CSFs by analyzing how a contest adminis-
trator rationally decides whether to have a contest and if a contest takes place how he chooses
among a xed set of CSFs. In contrast, in our approach the administrator chooses determin-
istically but the contestants face a CSF because of their uncertainty about the type of the
administrator.
2 External Decider
2.1 Two Contestants
Assume that one person has to decide to award a prize to one of two contestants. In the situation
we have in mind contestants are uncertain about a characteristic of the decider that is relevant
for his decision. So contestants exert e¤ort without knowing the realization of the characteristic
and then the decision-maker decides whom to give the prize based both on the contestants
e¤orts and his type.
Let  be the set of states of the world. Let  be an arbitrary element of . We assume
that  = [0; 1] and that  is uniformly distributed. Let Vi be the deciders payo¤ if the prize is
awarded to contestant i = 1; 2. Vi is assumed to depend on the state of the world, i.e. Vi = Vi().
This may reect the uncertainty in the contestantsminds about the preferences of the decider.
We will assume the following single-crossing property.
(SC) V1() is decreasing in  and V2() is strictly increasing in .
Taking into account e¤orts, let Ui(Vi(); Gi) be the deciders payo¤ if the prize is awarded
to contestant i = 1; 2. This function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments and for
simplicity we will write Ui(;Gi). For the sake of interpretation let Gi be interpreted as the
level of advertisement (resp. quality) made (resp. provided) by contestant i = 1; 2. Let
0 =
8><>:
1 if U1(;G1) > U2(;G2);8 2 
0 if U1(;G1) < U2(;G2);8 2 
fjU1(;G1) = U2(;G2)g otherwise.
(10)
Under our assumptions 0 is well-dened and unique. Moreover, 0 equals p1, the probability
that contestant 1 gets the prize. We now provide several examples in which we solve for p1 as
4Hillman and Riley (1989) came close to the idea of a contest administrator. They propose a political impact
function that reects the inuence of a player as a function of her e¤ort and a random variable. They notice that
for two agents it is possible to specify a functional form for this function which yields the Tullock probability
function (see also Hirshleifer and Riley (1992)). This was generalized by Jia (2007) to n > 2. In related work
Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Baye and Hoppe (2003) o¤er micro-foundations for a subset of CSFs of the form
in (1) in the context of innovation tournaments and patent races following an analogous procedure.
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a function of G1 and G2. This way we obtain the contest success function as arising from the
maximization of the payo¤ function of the decider.
In these examples Vi() enters either additively (in the spirit of McFadden (1974)) or mul-
tiplicatively (as in Hillman and Riley (1989)). In Examples 1 and 2 the e¤ect of a contestants
advertisement is completely separated from the deciders bias. The function Ui(;Gi) is addi-
tively separable in both arguments. Here, the merit of an alternative in the deciders eyes might
be positive even when advertising is zero, and vice versa. Moreover, the marginal product of
advertising is independent of the deciders bias. This contrasts with the multiplicative form of
Example 3 in which (i) a prerequisite for the merit of an alternative is both that the decider
likes it (at least a little) and that advertising is positive; and (ii) an increase of the deciders bias
raises the marginal product of advertising. Example 4 is a combination of these two extreme
cases in the sense that for one contestant the relationship is multiplicative, while for the other
the e¤ect of advertising is independent of the bias.
Example 1 Let U1(;G1) = V1()+a1G1 and U2(;G2) = V2()+a2G2, where a1; a2 > 0. Thus,
a1G1 a2G2 = V2() V1()  z(), say. Since z() is invertible we get, p1 = z 1(a1G1 a2G2)
which is the form in (6) considered by Baik (1998).5 Notice that this procedure is identical to
the one used in models of spatial di¤erentiation in order to obtain the demand function (see
Hotelling (1929)).
Example 2 Let U1(;G1) =  + 2G1   1=2 and U2(;G2) =   + 2G2 + 1=2, where  is a
positive scalar. In this case, it is easily calculated that p1 = max fmin f1=2 + (G1  G2); 1g ; 0g.
We obtain (7) the family of di¤erence-form contest success functions analyzed by Che and Gale
(2000).
Example 3 Let U1(;G1) = (1   )f1(G1) and U2(;G2) = f2(G2). Here we obtain p1 =
f1(G1)=(f1(G1) + f2(G2)). This is the additive CSF (5) for n = 2.
Example 4 Let U1(;G1) = f1(G1) and U2(;G2) = 2f2(G2) if   1=2 and U2(;G2) =
f2(G2)=(2(1  )) if 1=2   < 1. Analogous reasoning as before yields p1 = f1(G1)=(2f2(G2)) if
f1(G1)  f2(G2) and p1 = 1  f2(G2)=(2f1(G1)) otherwise. This expression is a generalization
of the family of serial contests in (8) analyzed in Alcalde and Dahm (2007).
In order to derive a general result concerning what kind of CSFs can be derived from the
maximization of the payo¤s of the decider we will now consider the class of CSF which are C1
in Rn++. This leaves outside our study CSFs like (7) but includes (8) when n = 2.
A di¢ culty in our study is that many well-known CSFs fail to be continuous when Gi = 0 all
i and constant in its own e¤ort when Gj = 0 all j 6= i, e.g. (1). A way to solve these problems
is to stay away from the troublesome boundaries of Rn+ as we do in Denitions 2.1 and 2.2.
5Alternatively, we may assume that the payo¤ function of the decider is Ui = Vi()   ajGj , i 6= j, reecting
the disutility received from the e¤ort made by contestant 2, if the prize is awarded to contestant 1. The same
applies to Example 2 and to Example 3 by taking U1 = (1  )=f2(G2) and U2 = =f1(G1).
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Denition 2.1 pi = pi(G) is regular if for all G 2 Rn++, @pi(G)=@Gi > 0 and @pi(G)=@Gj < 0
for all j 6= i.
Notice that the CSFs in (1) (4) and (6) are regular. The one in (5) is regular if we assume,
as in Szidarovsky and Okuguchi (1997), that f
0
i (Gi) > 0 and fi(0) = 0 for all i 2 N . The CSF
given in (8) is regular if n = 2.
Denition 2.2 The contest success function fp1(G); p2(G); :::; pn(G)g is rationalizable if there
is a list of payo¤ functions Ui(;Gi) strictly increasing on Gi; i = 1; 2; :::; n such that for any
G^ 2 Rn++;
pi(G^) = probabilityfUi(; G^i) > Uj(; G^j);8j 6= ig; for i = 1; :::; n.
We need the following assumption:
Assumption 1: pi ! 1 when Gi !1 and pi ! 0 when Gi ! 0.
It is easy to check that Tullocks CSF (1) satises Assumption 1 (A.1 in the sequel). Also
the additive CSF (5) satises A.1 when fi(Gi) are strictly positive for strictly positive values of
e¤orts, fi !1 when Gi !1 and fi ! 0 when Gi ! 0. It is fullled by the serial CSF in (8)
and the form in (6) includes cases where A.1 is satised. Now we can prove the following:
Proposition 2.1 If A.1 holds and p1(G1; G2) is regular, it is rationalizable by a pair of payo¤
functions fullling the single crossing condition. If p1(G1; G2) is rationalizable by a pair of payo¤
functions fullling the single crossing condition and @pi(G)=@Gj 6= 0 for all i; j, it is regular.
Proof. Suppose p1(G1; G2) is regular. Notice that this implies that for any G 2 R2++,
pi 2 (0; 1). Let f(p1; G1; G2)  p1   p1(G1; G2). Fix p1 and G2, say p1 and G2. By A.1 we
have that f(p1; G1; G2) < 0 for G1 su¢ ciently large and f(p1; G1; G2) > 0 for G1 su¢ ciently
close to zero. By the intermediate value theorem, there is a G1 such that f(p1; G1; G2) = 0. By
the denition of a regular CSF this value of G1, say G1, is unique. This means that there is a
unique function H such that G1 = H(p1; G2). Since @f(p1; G1; G2)=@G1 < 0, by the implicit
function theorem H is continuous in a neighborhood of (p1; G2). Since this point is arbitrary, H
is continuous for all (p1; G2). Let U1 = G1 and U2 = H(;G2). Because p1(G1; G2) is regular,
H is strictly increasing on  and G2. Also U1 is strictly increasing on G1 and constant on ,
so the SC assumption holds. By construction, 0 (as dened in equation (10)) equals p1, thus
p1(G1; G2) is rationalizable.
Assume now that p1(G1; G2) is rationalizable by a list of payo¤ functions fullling the single
crossing condition (SC). Rationalizability implies that for any (G^1; G^2) we have p1(G^1; G^2) = 0
(as dened in equation (10)). Moreover, as U1 is strictly increasing on G1 and by the single
crossing condition (SC) U2 is strictly increasing on , we have that p1 is strictly increasing in
G1. The opposite holds when G2 is increased, so the result follows from @pi(G)=@Gj 6= 0.
We show now that the condition that the partial derivatives do not vanish cannot be dis-
pensed with.
7
Example 5 Consider the following smooth di¤erence-form contest between two contestants:
p1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if G1  G2  1
1
2 +
1
2e

 (G1 G2 1)2
1 (G1 G2 1)2

if 1 > G1  G2  0
1
2e

 (G1 G2)2
1 (G1 G2)2

if 0  G1  G2 >  1
0 if  1  G1  G2
and p2 = 1  p1. (11)
As in (7), the win probability might be zeroeven for positive e¤ort. Contrary to (7) it is C1.
Notice that for jG1  G2j  1, p1 is strictly monotonic. However, when G1 = G2 the derivative
vanishes. So, this CSF is not regular. Dene U1 = G1 +
p
(  lnx)=(1  lnx)   a, where
(x; a) = (2; 0) if 0 <   1=2 and (x; a) = (2  1; 1) if 1=2 <   1.6 Let U2 = G2. Notice that
SC holds. Straightforward manipulations show that this pair of utility functions rationalizes the
smooth di¤erence-form contest in (11).
2.2 More than Two Contestants
In the case of three contestants the previous argument does not yield microfoundations for the
additive CSF (5). There are two reasons for that which are explained in Propositions 2.2 and
2.3 below. The rst result shows that it might be impossible to partition  in n non-empty
intervals which is what is implied by the SC assumption. The second result shows that even if
such a partition is assumed, the win probability of a given contestant might not be responsive to
changes in the e¤orts of all other contestants, as in (5). First, we need the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Ui(;Gi) are continuous and Ui(;Gi)!1 when Gi !1, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
This assumption (A.2 in the sequel) is fullled in the payo¤ functions used in Examples 1
and 2 above. In the case of Example 3 and 4 this assumption is fullled if fi(Gi) ! 1 when
Gi ! 1 which is the case in (1). Thus, it looks like a pretty harmless assumption. However,
its consequences are not.
Proposition 2.2 Under Assumption A.2, and when n = 3, the additive CSF (5) cannot be
obtained from payo¤ maximization when SC holds for players 1 and 2.
Proof. Let U 03(G3) = maxU3(;G3),  2 . The maximum exists and varies continuously
with G3 (by Berges maximum theorem). By taking G1 and G2 large enough, say G01 and G02,
the property (SC) and A.2 imply that there is a , such that
U1(;G
0
1) > U
0
3(G3);8 2 [0; )
U2(;G
0
2) > U
0
3(G3);8 2 (; 1]:
Thus, player 3 never obtains the prize. Moreover, because U 03() is continuous in G3, small
variations in G3 do not a¤ect neither p1 nor p2, thus the result.
6One might also dene U1 = G1 + 1, when  = 0.
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Similar results can be obtained for n > 3 by extending suitably the SC condition. However, as
the next result shows, even weak generalizations of the SC condition cause lack of rationalizability
of the additive CSF (5) even if Assumption A.2 is not postulated. First let us consider the
following generalization of SC.
Denition 2.3 A collection of payo¤ functions Ui(;Gi) i = 1; 2; :::; n satises the Generalized
Single Crossing (GSC) condition when for all G, there is a permutation in the set of agents
i; j; :::; k and a partition of , (i;ij ;j ; ::::r;rk;k) such that s = f j Us(;Gs) >
Ur(;Gr), 8r 6= sg, s = i; j; :::; k, sh = f j Us(;Gs) = Uh(;Gh)g, with all sh singletons for
s; h = i; j; :::; k.
Notice that, when n = 2, GSC is implied by SC.
Proposition 2.3 When the utility functions satisfy the GSC and are continuous, the additive
CSF (5) cannot be obtained from payo¤ maximization.
Proof. We will prove the result for n = 3. The extension to n > 3 is straightforward.
Without loss of generality let the permutation of N be 1; 2; 3: Then,
U1(;G1) > Uj(;Gj); j = 2; 3;8 2 1
U2(;G2) > Uj(;Gj); j = 1; 3;8 2 2
U3(;G3) > Uj(;Gj); j = 1; 2;8 2 3:
Thus, p1 = length 1, p2 = length 2 and p3 = length 3. It is clear that p1 (resp. p3) does
not depend on G3 (resp. G1) for small variations of this variable. Thus, the required functional
form can not be obtained in this case.
Notice that the results in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 do not depend on F () being uniform.
The reason is that given an interval [a; b] di¤erent distributions assign di¤erent probability mass
F (b)   F (a). However, in these results it is crucial that the delimiters a and b do not depend
on the e¤ort of one contestant.
Albeit this di¢ culty in deriving the additive CSF (5) for more than three contestants, con-
testants uncertainty about the type of the contest administrator seems to be a reasonable
approach to CSFs. Therefore, it is an important research program to nd contest success func-
tions that are rationalizable according to Denition 2.2 above and to work out the consequences
of these new functional forms on equilibrium, comparative statics, etc. We show now that al-
though this route appears to be promising, it is not free from di¢ culties. We will work out two
examples and we will show that in both cases:7
 Contest success functions are neither di¤erentiable nor concave.
 Despite the symmetric nature of basic data, no symmetric Nash equilibrium exists.
7This may also happen for n = 2, see Che and Gale (2000).
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Example 6 Let U1(;G1) = (1   )G1, U2(;G2) = G22=3 and U3(;G3) = G3. Notice that
if G1 = G2 = G3, p1 = p2 = p3 = 1=3. We will compute the best reply of contestant 1.
If G22=3 < G3 we have two cases: First, if G1 < G22=3, then p1 = 0. Second, if G1  G22=3,
then
p1 =
(
(G1  G22=3) =G1 if G1 < (G3G22=3) = (G3  G22=3)
G1=(G1 +G3) otherwise.
If G22=3  G3 we have again two cases
p1 =
(
0 if G1 < G22=3
(G1  G22=3) =G1 otherwise.
In a symmetric equilibrium G^ we have G1  G22=3 and G1 < (G3G22=3) = (G1  G22=3).
Thus, contestant 1 maximizes V (G1 G22=3)=G1 G1, where V is the value of the prize. If the
equilibrium is symmetric it must be at positive level of e¤ort. Thus, the maximum is interior
and the rst order condition yields the best reply, namely G1 = (V G22=3)1=2.
For G^1 = G^2 this yields G^1 = V 2=3. We now have to make sure that this payo¤ is larger than
the payo¤ associated to G1 = 0 (yielding a p1 and a payo¤ equal to 0). This is equivalent to
G^2  V 27=100, which contradicts G^1 = G^2 = V 2=3.
Example 6 can be criticized because the existence of endpoints (0 and 1) makes contestants
non-symmetric. For instance, if G1 = G2 = G3, a variation of G2 a¤ects p1 and p3, but a
variation of G1 only a¤ects p2. Thus, we now adapt the model of Salop (1979) of a circular
city to our framework. Here symmetry of the e¤ects of e¤orts is restored since each contestant
a¤ects the win probability of all other contestants.
Example 7 Suppose that three contestants are symmetrically distributed at locations (l1; l2; l3) =
(0; 1=3; 2=3) on the unit circle, which is now our set of states of the world. Assume that
Ui(;Gi) = u   k jli   j + Gi , where u, k and  are positive scalars and   1. Notice
that when e¤ort levels are similar, the relevant competition is pairwise: 1 competes only with
2 (resp. 3) for  2 [0; 1=3] (resp.  2 [2=3; 1]), while only 2 and 3 compete for  2 [1=3; 2=3].
Thus, the state of the world for which, given e¤orts, the decider is indi¤erent between candidates
1 and 2 is
12 =
1
6
+
1
2k
(G1  G2 ) :
A similar reasoning in the case of 1 and 3 yields
13 =
5
6
+
1
2k
(G3  G1 ) :
This implies that p1 = 12+1  13. In order to determine the CSF in general, suppose without
loss of generality that G1  G2  G3. If G1  G3  k=3, then we obtain a generalized version
of Che and Gales 2-player contest (given in (7))
p1 = min

1
2
+
1
k
(G1  G2 ); 1

, p2 = 1  p1 and p3 = 0;
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and otherwise
pi =
1
3
+
1
2k
 
2Gi  Gj  Gk

, for i = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; k.
Assume  < 1. A symmetric equilibrium G^ requires that G^1 maximizes 1s payo¤s, given G^2
and G^3 and that G^1 = G^2 = G^3. Thus, G^1 maximizes p1V   G1, where V is the value of the
prize. If the maximum is interior, G^1 = (V=k)
1=(1 ). Thus if payo¤s for 1 for this value of
e¤orts are negative, 0 e¤ort is the best reply and no symmetric equilibrium exists.
Note that it is straightforward to extend the last example to more than three contestants.
The so derived CSF can be seen as an extension of Che and Gales linear di¤erence-form (given
in (7)) to more than two contestants (see (9)).
2.3 An Alternative Notion of Rationalizability
The simple setting considered so far might be adapted in several ways in order to yield the
additive CSF (5) when there are more than three contestants: (i) The type of the contest
administrator might be multidimensional; (ii) the distribution function might be non-uniform;
(iii) the rationalizability notion might be di¤erent. Given that (i) and (ii) have already be
explored (e.g. in Hillman and Riley (1989)), we pursue now (iii).
Consider a situation where a contest administrator cares not only about the e¤ort of the
winner of the contest but also about the e¤ort of others. One might think of the promotion of
workers in a rm based on their performance or of rms competing for a research prize based
on R&D investment which generates new knowledge. In such a situation the type of the decider
represents how much he values the e¤ort of a particular contestant relative to the others. We
present an example yielding a special case of the additive CSF (5) for three contestants. This
example can easily be extended to more agents and to more general e¤ectivity functions.
Example 8 Let U1 = (1   )G1   (G2 + G3), U3 = G3   (1   )(G1 + G2) and normalize
U2 = 0. We have that
U1  U2 ,   12  G1
G1 +G2 +G3
;
U1  U3 ,   13  2G1 +G2
2(G1 +G2 +G3)
;
U3  U2 ,   23  G1 +G2
G1 +G2 +G3
:
This yields
p1 = 12 =
G1
G1 +G2 +G3
, p2 = 23   12 = G2
G1 +G2 +G3
and p3 = 1  23 = G3
G1 +G2 +G3
.
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3 Contest Success Functions as Sharing Rules
Inspired by the second interpretation of the outcome of a contest as shares of the prize we
establish now a connection to bargaining and claims problems. This can be interpreted as
contestants bargaining over all possible assignments of win probabilities or over shares. If no
agreement is reached, all win probabilities are zero. In our approach, a variation in e¤ort only
a¤ects the share of the prize. A more complete theory might consider that the size of the prize
is also a¤ected. This allows taking into account the opportunity cost of e¤ort (see Anbarci,
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) and Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007)).
3.1 ClassicalBargaining
A contest problem is a vector f(G) = (f1(G1); :::; fn(Gn)) with at least two entries each of
which strictly positive.8 Since we consider a xed vector of e¤orts G, we will simply use the
notation fi instead of fi(Gi) and f instead of f(G). An allocation in a contest problem is a
n-tuple p = (p1; :::; pn) 2 Rn with 0  pi  1 and
Pn
i=1 pi = 1. A contest success function is a
function that assigns a unique allocation to each contest problem.
We dene now a bargaining problem associated with each contest problem. A bargaining
problem is a pair (S;d) where S  Rn is a compact convex set, d 2 S and there exists s 2 S such
that si > di; i = 1; :::; n. The set S, the feasible set, consists of all utility vectors attainable by
the n contestants through unanimous agreement. The disagreement point d is the utility vector
obtained if there is no agreement. In our context it seems natural to dene
S =
(
p 2 Rn
0  pi  1 and
nX
i=1
pi  1
)
and d = 0.
A bargaining solution is a function  assigning to each bargaining problem (S;d) a unique
element in S. We are interested in the weighted Nash solution with weights .
Denition 3.1 Let i > 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. The -asymmetric Nash solution is dened as
  = argmax
p2S
ni=1 (pi   di)i :
In this framework it is natural that the e¤ort of a contestant determines his bargaining
position. Suppose that e¤orts a¤ect the exponents of the weighted Nash bargaining solution as
dened above. For simplicity, let  = f . The next result is parallel to one obtained by Dagan
and Volij (1993) in a di¤erent framework.9
Proposition 3.1 The -asymmetric Nash solution for  = f induces the additive CSF (5).
8 If fi(Gi) = 0 for some contestant i, assign zero win probability to this agent and consider the reduced vector
in which the entry corresponding to agent i is missing.
9 In the literature the weighted Nash solution has also been interpreted as a decider maximizing a payo¤
function. This is another example of the connections between the approaches taken in Section 2 and here.
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Proof. Let f be a contest problem, consider the associated bargaining problem and let
  = p. The rst-order conditions of the maximization problem dening the asymmetric Nash
solution with d = 0 imply that
pj =
j
i
pi ; for all i; j 2 N .
Given the Pareto optimality of the asymmetric Nash solution we have that
Pn
j=1 pj = 1. This
implies pi = i=
Pn
j=1 j .
Since the preceding result sheets light on the additive CSF (5) from a very di¤erent angle
than the approach of the previous section, it is of interest in its own right. However, it also
opens the door to understand CSFs as the outcome of strategic bargaining models based on
Rubinsteins alternating o¤ers game. Since it is well known that under certain conditions the
asymmetric Nash solution can be supported by such a game, it follows that alternative conditions
thought to reect reasonable properties of underlying institutional details can yield alternative
CSFs.
3.2 Bargaining with Claims
It might seem odd that, while the e¤ort vector f denes a contest problem, this information
is not used in the description of the associated bargaining problem (S;d). If we want to incor-
porate this information in the description of the problem, the relevant framework is the one of
bargaining problems with claims (Chun and Thomson (1992)).10 A contest bargaining problem
is then a triple (S;d;f) with the following interpretation: Contestants bargain over all possible
assignments of win probabilities. The contestantse¤ectivity functions translate individual e¤ort
into an aspiration pointf . Thus, f(G) measures the social merit that society or the decider
awards to the vector of e¤orts G.
If no unanimous agreement is reached, all win probabilities are zero. A contest bargaining
solution  assigns to each such triple a unique element in S. A maximal point p of S is a point
such that
Pn
j=1 pj = 1. The proportional solution is dened as follows.
Denition 3.2 The proportional solution P is dened as the maximal point p of S on the
segment connecting the disagreement point d and the aspiration point f .
Proposition 3.2 The proportional solution induces the additive CSF (5).
Proof. Let f be a contest problem, consider the associated bargaining problem with claims
and let P = p. The line which passes through the two points d and f is the set of vectors x
of the form x = (1   t)d + tf , with t 2 R. Since d = 0, x = tf . Given that p is a maximal
point, we have that t = 1=
Pn
j=1 fj . This implies p

i = fi=
Pn
j=1 fj .
10Notice that a contest problem is not equivalent to a bargaining problem with claims. One important di¤erence
is that in contest problems there is no upper bound on individual e¤ort levels, that is, f .
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The richer description of bargaining problems with claims has allowed to dene an alternative
solution that also explicitly builds on the aspiration point f . Bossert (1993) analyzes the claim-
egalitarian solution. For the purpose of the next proposition it su¢ ces to consider the case of
two contestants. The following denition is adapted to our context because in contest problems
there is no upper bound on individual e¤ort levels, that is, f .
Denition 3.3 Let n = 2 and fh  fl, h; l = 1; 2. The claim-egalitarian solution E is dened
as the maximal point p of S such that fh   ph = fl   pl if fh   fl  1. Otherwise ph = 1 and
pl = 0.
The claim-egalitarian solution selects a point on the Pareto frontier of S such that the loss
of each contestant compared with his aspiration level is the same for all agents (if such a point
exists). This is an egalitarian solution in the sense that the absolute amount each agent has to
give up is equalized across contestants. The next proposition says that this idea is the same as
saying that only di¤erences in e¤ort matter.
Proposition 3.3 For n = 2, the claim-egalitarian solution induces a generalization of Che and
Gales di¤erence-form contest success function, that is,
Ei = p
CG0
i (G) = max

min

1
2
+
1
2
(fi   fj) ; 1

; 0

for i = 1; 2.
Proof. The fact that if jfi   fj j  1 then Ei = pCG
0
i (G) is obvious. Suppose jfi   fj j  1.
Since pj = 1  pi, we have fi   pi = fj   (1  pi). Rearranging yields the desired expression.
Notice that when fi(Gi) = 2Gi for i = 1; 2 where  is a positive scalar, we obtain (7),
the class of linear di¤erence-form functions analyzed in Che and Gale (2000). Notice that it is
straightforward to extend the last result to more than three contestants (see (9)).11 Interestingly,
this recommendation di¤ers in the minimal e¤ort necessary to obtain a non-zero share and in
the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort from the one based on Example 7.
Denition 3.3 equalizes losses based on absolute claims. This creates the kink and the
non-responsiveness of Che and Gales CSF to e¤ort when the di¤erence in aspiration levels is
high enough. Considering relative claims this can be avoided. Notice that fi=fh (for i = 1; :::; n)
indicates the percentage contestant is aspiration level fi constitutes of the highest level fh.
Denition 3.4 Let n = 2 and w.l.o.g. denote fh = maxff1; f2g. The relative claim-egalitarian
solution RE is dened as the maximal point p of S such that f1=fh   p1 = f2=fh   p2.
11For n = 3 and f1  f2  f3, it is natural to require the following. If f1 f2  1, then p1 = 1 and p2 = p3 = 0.
If f1   f3  1 > f1   f2, then E is the maximal point p of S such that p3 = 0 and f1   p1 = f2   p2. Lastly,
when f1   f3 < 1, then E is the maximal point p of S such that f1   p1 = f2   p2 = f3   p3.
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The relative claim-egalitarian solution selects a point on the Pareto frontier of S such that
the loss of each contestant compared with this relative claim pointis the same for all agents.
The next proposition relates this idea to the serial CSF.12
Proposition 3.4 For n = 2 and f1  f2, the relative claim-egalitarian solution induces a
generalization of the serial contest success function, that is,
REi = p
S0
i (G) =
2X
j=i
fj   fj+1
j  fh for i = 1; 2 and f3 = 0.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume f1  f2. We have that 1  p1 = f2=f1   p2 = f2=f1   1 + p1. This
can be rewritten as p1 = 1  f2=(2f1) = (f1   f2)=f1 + f2=(2f1). Since RE must be a maximal
point, we obtain p2 = f2=(2f1).
4 Concluding Remarks
In line with two prominent interpretations of the outcome of contests, this paper has investigated
foundations for prominent contest success functions based on two di¤erent approaches. The rst
analyzes the implications of contestants incomplete information concerning the type of the
contest administrator. The second understands CSFs as sharing rules and makes a connection
to bargaining and claims problems. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest
success functions and guidelines for the denition of new ones. The results of this paper suggest
two lines for future research on contest success functions.
On the normative side, the implications of linking the problem of assigning win probabil-
ities in contests to bargaining, claims and taxation problems are twofold. On one hand, this
connection might yield an improved understanding of existing contest success functions, while,
on the other hand, it suggests guidelines for the denition of new ones. As for the former, for
instance, proportionality principles have been defended at least since the philosophers of ancient
Greece. Therefore, it seems possible to obtain di¤erent characterizations of the additive CSF
(5) using ideas of characterizations of proportionality stressed in these related problems.13 As
for the latter, di¤erent normative principles might lead to the formulation of di¤erent classes
of contest success functions. A case in point here is the claim-egalitarian solution that gives a
recommendation how to extend the di¤erence-form functions analyzed in Che and Gale (2000)
to more than two contestants.
12This reasoning can easily be extended to more contestants. However, the requirement that fi=fh   pi =
fi+1=fh   pi+1 for all i = 1; :::; n   1 does not always yield well dened win probabilities. A way out is the
following. Consider an ordered vector f1  f2  :::  fn and rescale the relative claim pointin order to make
the pairwise comparisons fi=(i fh) pi = fi+1=(i fh) pi+1 for all i = 1; :::; n 1. This coincides with Denition
3.4 when there are two agents and yields a generalization of the serial contest success function for any number of
contestants.
13Note that the class of problems in which win probabilities are assigned has a particularly simple structure.
This implies that a characterization of a solution for a larger class of problems does not need to characterize a
solution for contests.
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On the positive side, the implications for future research parallel the normative ones. On
one hand, strategic foundations of solution concepts in bargaining, claims and taxation problems
that can be related to popular contest success functions might yield rationales for the latter.
An example is to link contests with the Bilateral Principle that has proved a fruitful way to
incorporate Luces Choice Axiom into game theory. Dagan et al. (1997) have provided a game
form capturing the non-cooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules.14
An adaptation of their result in our framework shows that the additive CSF (5), can be supported
by a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of a certain non-cooperative game.
On the other hand, by incorporating realistic details of contest situations novel contest
success functions can be derived. Examples are the recommendation of the circular model in
Example 7 how to extend Che and Gales di¤erence-form function to more than two contestants
or the e¤ects of modifying Rubinsteins alternating o¤ers bargaining game. Lastly, we remark
that there is no straightforward generalization of the single-crossing property that would gener-
alize the results of Section 2.1 to more than two contestants. In any case, there might be a way
to allow for conditional preferences over subsets of players (e.g. in the spirit of Luces Choice
Axiom) that would allow for a representation theorem.
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